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WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ANYWHERE, U.S.A.?:
THE NEED TO BREAK THE LOG JAM AND
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM OF SUPERFUND
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
For agony and spoil
Of nations beat to dust,
For poisoned air and torturedsoil
And cold, commanded lust,
And every secret woe
The shudderingwaters sawWilled andfulfilled by high and lowLet them relearnthe Law 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine living in your home, going about your daily business,
raising your family, and contending with the various challenges of life,
only to have your seemingly tranquil world devastated by the discovery
that your household water is polluted, or that the soil beneath your
home is contaminated by hazardous waste which was buried many
years ago.2 Such an unwelcome discovery could occur anywhere. Often,
the pernicious results of hazardous waste disposals do not manifest
themselves until years later.3 Such results are demonstrated in the

'RUDYARD KIPLING, Justice (1918), in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 300 (3d ed.

1979).
This general proposition was written by the author and is meant to illustrate how the
release of hazardous waste knows no boundaries.
3 See DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S Toxics
POLICY FOR THE 1990s 27 (1992) (stating that "[Tihe effects of these chemicals might at times
be obvious and immediate... even more frightening for some people, the toxins could be
slow to appear, (only showing up] long after the time when anything could be done to
prevent trouble"). See also BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE: A
HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT AND CLEANUP LAWS OF NEW JERSEY 4 (1991) (maintaining that "[Tlhe
behavior of chemicals underground unseen by the public and Congress ... was poorly
understood and difficult to measure or predict"). See also CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N.
SKINNER, THE ROAD To LOVE CANAL: MANAGING INDUSTRIAL WASTE BEFORE E.P.A. 46
(1996) (stating that in the 1940s and 1950s, hazardous waste disposals were made with
efficiency as the main concern; consequently, this practice resulted in the creation and
subsequent discovery of many hazardous waste sites with many remaining to be
discovered).
2
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legacies of the Valley of the Drums4 and the Love Canal. 5 The problem
posed by the disposal of hazardous waste is very significant because no
one can guarantee immunity from the adverse effects of such disposals.
Indeed, the nearby town of Anywhere, U.S.A., is currently battling with
6
the aftermath of such disposals.
Anywhere, U.S.A., has a population of about 15,000. It is not quite a
small city, but it is larger than a typical rural town. The closest city,
Responsibility, with a population of 200,000, is twenty miles away.
Anywhere is rarely visited by the city dwellers since it is a small suburb
lacking in points of interest. Strangers are, therefore, something of a
rarity in Anywhere. The town is small enough for people to nod and
give a smile of recognition to one another while walking the local streets
or shopping in the local stores. The town's public schools are highly
rated, and many parents are actively involved in the PTA. The citizens
of Anywhere take pride in their community. They have established a
neighborhood crime watch program and believe that their efforts have
assisted in maintaining a safe community known for a virtually nonexistent rate of serious crime. A large number of residents are blue-collar
workers who commute daily to jobs in the nearby city of Responsibility.
4See 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA

SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE 3 (1992). The
Valley of the Drums refers to an area in Kentucky where users threw approximately twenty
thousand drums into a ravine. Id. These drums contained hazardous substances which
leaked into the soil, permeated the ground, and adversely affected the groundwater. Id.
The negative effects upon the nation's groundwater are especially important since close to

50% of water used for consumption nationwide is groundwater. Id.
5
See id. at 4. See also MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 3, at 3. The Love Canal, located in
Niagara Falls, New York, was used as a burial site for toxic chemicals during the 1940s and
early 1950s by Occidental Petroleum's Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corporation. Id. The
Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corporation disposed of over twenty thousand tons of
hazardous waste at this site before selling it to the Niagara Falls Board of Education in
1953. Id. The school district then sold lots for family homes and built an elementary school
on the site, but in 1977 the Niagara River overflowed, flooding the canal area and forcing
contaminated groundwater into the homes of area residents. Id. The groundwater
contained more than two hundred toxic chemicals, including benzene, trichloroethylene,
and dioxin. Id. Residents were forced to evacuate their homes after President Carter
designated Love Canal an emergency disaster area. Id. The federal government eventually
spent more than $30 million to purchase the homes of those in the area. This figure does
not include the cost of the cleanup. Id. See also Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The
Superfund Debate, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICs, SCIENCE, AND LAW 3, 5 (1995)
(explaining Love Canal and its effects on public awareness, including the mention of the
New York State Health Commissioner's report on the Love Canal crisis, termed "Love
Canal: Public Health Time Bomb").
6 This hypothetical and the ensuing names are a product of the author's imagination and
will be carried throughout this paper to concretely illustrate how a populace can be
affected by hazardous waste, and, more pointedly, how the responsible parties can be held
legally liable for their actions.
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Responsibility has three major companies located within its limits,
and most of Anywhere's residents who commute to Responsibility are
employed in some capacity at one of these three companies. One
company is Lacquer Paint which has been in Responsibility for thirty
years; another is Acme Plastics which has been in the city for nineteen
years; and the third is Beaker Chemicals which has operated there for
only ten years. Each company generates hazardous waste and disposes
of this waste by depositing it in sealed containers at the Glorious Waste
Site located three miles outside of Anywhere. 7 For many years these
disposals attracted little attention. Recently, however, government
officials have made a disturbing discovery: the containers stored at the
Glorious Waste Site have leaked, releasing hazardous wastes into the
nearby soil and polluting the drinking water supply of Anywhere. The
government has initiated a lawsuit against the generator companies, all
of which transport their own waste to the site.
Such scenarios are not uncommon, and their effects are very real.8
Public awareness of the need to address hazardous waste disposal
increased dramatically in the early 1980's in the aftermath of
environmental disasters such as the well-publicized Love Canal and the
Valley of the Drums. 9 Such examples attracted widespread public
attention, and the nation grew increasingly worried about the effects of

7Lacquer Paint disposes of ketones and various organic solvents; Acme Plastics disposes of
benzene and styrenes; and Beaker Chemicals disposes of a large variety of organic
compounds. All of these substances are hazardous to varying degrees, and each company
transports its own wastes to the Glorious Waste Site, where the sealed containers are
buried.
8 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. See also School Was Considered as a Superfund
Site, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at A19 (discussing how a building previously used as a drycleaning plant was supposed to be used as an elementary school in Harlem, New York
City, beginning in the 1997 school term). The plans to use the building as an elementary
school came to an abrupt halt once environmental officials detected alarming levels of
potentially hazardous fumes. Id. The environmental officials told New York City officials
that the solvent perchloroethylene, used by the dry-cleaning plant, had leaked through the
concrete floor and permeated the soil underneath. Id. Environmental officials took action
to halt the opening of the school because studies have shown that perchloroethylene has
negative effects upon the kidneys, the liver, and the nervous system. It is also thought to
cause cancer. Id. The school is currently being considered as an addition to the list of
Superfund sites which need cleanup. Id.
9 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 3, at 27. Public awareness indeed peaked in the
1980s, as illustrated through the results of a CBS News-Harris National poll, in which 86%
of Americans wanted to prioritize the need for federal action in relation to hazardous waste
sites and chemical spills. Id. at 28. See generally 1996 BRIEFING BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL
AND ENERGY LEGISLATION 78 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 BRIEFING BOOK] (addressing the
public's insistence that the government take action regarding hazardous waste).
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hazardous waste.' 0 This concern pervaded the Congress as well, for
"members of Congress were not willing to gamble away their political
futures on predictions that the hazardous waste issue would go away
anytime soon or that they could rely on the private sector to provide a
full remedy.""
Motivated both by the very real dangers of hazardous waste
disposal as well as by public and political pressure, Congress began
considering ways to address the situation. As a result, Congress passed
the Superfund, more formally known as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)."
After a lame duck session of Congress passed this legislation, President
Carter signed CERCLA to make it law on December 11, 1980.13 President
Carter's signing of CERCLA was one of his final acts before Ronald
Reagan assumed office. 14 CERCLA included a five year, $1.6 billion trust
fund, known as the Superfund, that would pay the expenses involved in
cleaning hazardous waste sites, chemical spills, and other types of
released environmental contaminants. 15 From the beginning of its hasty
10See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 3, at 29. The authors portray the nationwide
sentiment as one of agitation, stating that the United States became a "highly charged
atmosphere." Id. See also Revesz & Stewart, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that the public
perceived hazardous waste as a national crisis after witnessing environmental disasters
such as the Valley of the Drums and Love Canal).
1 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 3, at 29. See also TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 4, at 1
(stating that Congress was discontented with the potential political ramifications which
could result if it did not address the need for hazardous waste legislation); Revesz &
Stewart, supra note 5, at 5 (speaking of the bipartisan consensus for the need to legislate in
order to address the immediacy of the hazardous waste crisis).
12Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1998).
13The Superfund statute, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), also known as CERCLA,
was passed by a vote of 274 to 94 in the House of Representatives and 78 to 9 in the Senate.
Revesz & Stewart, supra note 5, at 5. The act passed despite the fact that President Carter
had lost the Presidential election to Reagan, and the Democrats had lost control of the
Senate to the Republicans. Id. See also MAZMANLAN & MORELL, supra note 3, at 29
(suggesting that the reason the legislation passed so quickly was the apprehension over
what position the upcoming Reagan administration would adopt). For further support of
this view, see KATHERINE N. PROBST & PAUL R. PORTNEY, ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR
SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 1 (1992).
14TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 4, at 2.
is 1996 BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 9, at 78. The money for the Superfund originated chiefly
from taxes on crude oil and other chemicals. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SUPERFUND: TRENDS IN SPENDING FOR SITE CLEANUPS 2 (1997) [hereinafter TRENDS].
The Superfund also contained a variety of other provisions, including:
1. call[ing] for a state-by-state inventory and evaluation of inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites;
2. set[ting] priorities for deanup of sites based on the danger they
presented;
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Congressional enactment, intense controversy has plagued the
16
Superfund, both among public interest groups and the private sector.
Public interest groups remain dissatisfied with the pace of cleanups,
while potentially liable public and private entities contend that the
liability provisions under Superfund are unnecessarily harsh.17 Congress
has considered several proposals to reform Superfund; however, the
only reform effort which has succeeded was the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 18 Although SARA was the
only successful Superfund reform proposal, it did not specify an
approach for addressing the issue of joint and several liability. 19 This
3. establish[ing] an emergency removal program to contain dangerous
releases from the sites;
4. cail[ing] for the eventual elimination of unsafe hazardous waste
disposal sites; and
5. provid[ing] a 'systematic method of funding' to identify inactive
hazardous waste sites, evaluate those sites, and contain or take other
remedial action to protect the public health and the environment in a
cost-effective manner.
1996 BRIEFING BOOK at 78.
16 See PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 13, at 1 (1992) (stating that "perhaps befitting this
frenzied origin, Superfund has been a controversial statute almost from the start"). See also
Robert F. Blomquist, SARA's Offspring: Some First Principlesfor Superfund Rejbrm in the
1990s, 9 J.NAT. REsoURcEs & ENVTL. L. 237 (1993-94) (maintaining that the Act was "hardly
a work of legislative craftsmanship" because it provided little legislative history and was
actually a "gerry-built consensus law"); VALERE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE
CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LMGATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAW 2
(1992) (stating that although Congress passed CERCLA, its passage was "fraught with
difficulties").
17See PROBST & PORTNEY, supra note 13, at 1. Public interest groups argue that the Act
provides neither a fast enough cleanup procedure nor a steadfast enough procedure
through which permanent remedies can be effectively achieved. Id. Public and private
entities, on the other hand, argue that liability should not be imposed upon them
retroactively; that is, if the disposal was legal at the time the entity carried it out, it should
not be held liable for the future possible ramifications resulting from the disposal. Id. Also,
these entities resent bearing the burden of site cleanup costs while other potentially
responsible parties, or PRPs, involved in the chain of disposal wait to see if they will be
sued by a PRP being forced to pay, or by the Environmental Protection Agency itself. Id.
This note specifically addresses joint and several liability in Superfund suits. For a
definition of joint and several liability, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (6th ed. 1990).
Joint and several liability holds a responsible party "[r]esponsible together and
individually. The person who has been harmed can sue and recover from both
wrongdoers or from either one of the wrongdoers [but if the person who has been harmed]
goes after both of them, [the person] does not, however, receive double compensation." Id.
18Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1998). The
SARA Amendments did not address the issue of joint and several liability, but they did
create measures pertaining to cleanup techniques, community involvement, and
enforcement provisions. See TRENDS, suuiranote 15, at 2
19See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1998). See
also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Note will focus on the issue of joint and several liability with regard to
the Superfund.
This Note will address the lack of specific language in the
Superfund regarding the imposition of joint and several liability and
explain the varying approaches federal courts have used in attacking the
problem. The federal courts generally follow one of two specific
approaches.20 Because no uniform approach exists with regard to the
liability question in a Superfund suit, the Superfund liability scheme is
commonly considered draconian. 21 The lack of a uniform approach with
regard to how a court should impose joint and several liability has led to
inconsistent results. 22 This lack of consistency perpetuates uncertainty
and seemingly inequitable results because the result largely depends
upon which federal court hears the case. 23 This Note will offer a uniform
approach towards the imposition of joint and several liability in
Supetfund suits. 24

By implementing a uniform approach, consistent

decisions in such suits can be achieved.
Section II of this Note will set out the necessary background for
understanding basic principles of joint and several liability, including the
development of joint and several liability principles under the traditional
common law and under the Restatement. 25 Section II will then explain
the rationale behind the enactment of CERCLA and outline who may be
held liable under the statute. 26 Finally, Section II will address the lack of
a specific joint and several liability provision in the original Superfund
statute, and show how its absence has sparked much controversy among
multiple responsible polluters. 27 Section III will explain the two major
alternate positions which federal courts have taken with regard to joint
and several liability in Superfund suits and analyze these positions
through case law. 28 Section IV will consider various proposals to reform
20 See
21

infra notes 86-131 and accompanying-text.

THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION

STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND ix (1993).

The authors refer to the Superfund as "America's

unique statutory scheme to use the more draconian elements of tort law to compel private
businesses and public entities to clean up hazardous waste sites." Id. Superfund is riddled
with much uncertainty as to how joint and several liability should be imposed, in the
absence of a specific statutory provision. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text, and

infra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.

2

231d.

2

See infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
infra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.

2

See infra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.

24

25 See

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss1/10

1998]

Stringer: What Will Happen to Anywhere, U.S.A.? The Need To Break the Logja

SUPERFUND LIABILITY

281

Superfund joint and several liability, but will focus mainly upon how the
current political climate is affecting the reform process. 29 Section IV will
also discuss an immediate environmental problem and, through its use,
illustrate why political compromise is essential. 30 Finally, Section V will
propose a uniform approach towards the imposition of joint and several
liability in a Superfund suit. 31
II.

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY PRINCIPLES

A. Joint and Several Liability Under the Common Law: A Historical Context
The principles of joint and several liability have developed
considerably since their English origins.3 2 Initially, joint and several
liability applied only to situations in which parties acted in concert while
committing some trespass. 33 In these instances, each person involved
consciously took some individual action to further the common venture
of all participants. 34 Consequently, each individual was a joint
tortfeasor.35 Each individual was held liable for the full amount of
resulting damages as punishment for acting in concert to commit an
unlawful act.36 These damages could not be apportioned among the

29 See infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.

30See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
31See infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
32See generallyW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 322 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (tracing the development of modem tort law);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 2
(1987) (providing an overview of the origins of tort law, beginning with its unwritten
tradition in England and discussing its adoption into American law); PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 20 (1988) (addressing how
American tort law is rooted in English common law).
3 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 322-23; ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT,
CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE: IS THERE A BETTER WAY? 54 (1993) (addressing why joint
and several liability was traditionally an issue only when parties acted in concert).
3 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 322-23. This concept can be illustrated through the
use of the hypothetical from the beginning of this note. If Lacquer Paint, Acme Plastics,
and Beaker Chemicals together decided to unite and harm a common customer, each
individual company would be liable for the actions of every company, even if one
company only played a minor role by comparison to the others. The hypothetical customer
is Nicholas Lawrence. If a representative from Lacquer Paint intended to break Lawrence's
leg with a piece of iron while a representative from Acme Plastics held him still, and a
representative from Beaker Chemicals was going to call Lawrence to get him to come to the
spot of the planned attack under pretense of a business meeting, the representatives have
acted in concert to promote a common plan.
35See id.
3 See id. (stating that parties were equally liable when they acted "in pursuance of a
common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively [took] part in it... further[ed] it
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parties according to degree of wrongdoing or involvement. 37 The theory
was that each individual perpetuated, and thus was responsible for, the
entire wrongdoing.-3
Therefore, under this interpretation, a joint
tortfeasor was not entitled to seek contribution from another joint
tortfeasor. 39
While the English courts adhered to the doctrine of imposing joint
and several liability only in cases that involved parties acting in concert,
the American courts began to broaden the doctrine. 4° The impetus for
expansion of the rule occurred in 1848 when New York State adopted the
Field Code of Procedure and other states subsequently adopted similar
codes. 41 These codes recognized that a plaintiff should be able to hold
parties liable when the parties' individual acts produced a single,
indivisible harm, even if the parties did not act in concert to further a
common venture.42 The rationale was that each party had contributed to
inflicting harm upon the plaintiff and should bear the consequences for
it, because the damages could not properly be apportioned. 43 The
by cooperation or request. . . or [provided] aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer.., or
ratif[ied] and adopt[ed] the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit").
7 Id.
3 Id.
39 Id. at 336-37. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 27 (discussing the common
law ban on contribution and criticizing the current movement toward permitting
contribution). Under the traditional common law rule, if Nicholas Lawrence won a lawsuit
awarding him $100,000 in damages from Beaker Chemicals, Beaker Chemicals cannot seek
contribution from the other two companies. For example, Beaker Chemicals, in turn,
cannot try to sue Acme Plastics or Lacquer Paint for contribution by claiming that its
involvement was not as serious, because its representative only telephoned Lawrence, and
did not actually maim him. Beaker Chemicals acted in concert with Acme Plastics and
Lacquer Paint to further the conspiracy, and it is as liable as the other companies.
40 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 325-26.
41 Id. at 325 (stating that the Field Code of Procedure in New York and the similar codes
adopted in other states were designed to facilitate joinder of parties so that all questions
relating to a lawsuit could be addressed at once). Initially, courts looked at these codes
with reluctance and adhered to the old rule that parties could only be joined if they had
acted in concert. Id. at 326. However, over time, joinder of parties occurred where separate
acts of defendants combined to produce an indivisible result in which harm could not be
apportioned. Id.
42Id. at 325. See also supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining why the code drafters
felt that parties should be able to be held jointly liable for indivisible harms). To illustrate
this idea, Nicholas Lawrence will once again be helpful. If Lawrence was standing
somewhere and a representative from Lacquer Paint clubbed him over the head and a
representative from Acme Plastics simultaneously clubbed him in the ribs, Lawrence's
resultant pain and suffering damages would be indivisible. In this situation, assume that
the representatives had not conspired to harm Lawrence and it was his unfortunate luck to
be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Lawrence could thus hold both Lacquer Paint
and Acme Plastics responsible for damages.
4
3See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 326.
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American courts generally did not allow contribution among joint
tortfeasors who had produced a single, indivisible harm until the 1970s. 44
Today, joint and several liability claims generally may be brought in
three instances. 45 Joint and several liability may be imposed when
liability ensues pursuant to operation of law, such as in respondeat
superior cases. 46 As discussed, joint and several liability may also be
imposed when parties acting in concert tortiously cause another party
harm.47 Finally, joint and several liability can be imposed when two or
more parties cause an indivisible harm to the plaintiff.48
When
considering joint and several liability in terms of the Superfund, the
instance which presents the most controversy is the third, because the
harm caused when multiple parties dispose of hazardous waste at a
common site is often indivisible. Therefore, this instance will be
discussed in this Note.
B.

The Restatement's Approach to Jointand Several Liability

The Restatement (Second) of Torts conforms to the current
American trend regarding the imposition of joint and several liability.
As Section 1H of this Note will illustrate, the Restatement approach to
joint and several liability is also the approach followed by the majority of
federal courts when imposing joint and several liability upon multiple
polluters in Superfund suits.49 Section 433A of the Restatement states
that damages for harm should be apportioned among two or more
causes when there are distinct harms or when a reasonable basis exists

" Id. at 337.

See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 220-21 (listing each state and
whether it follows the current trend toward allowing contribution). If a state has adopted a
statute authorizing such movement, the table states whether the statute is typically read
broadly or narrowly in that respective state. Id.
45 See VINcENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GuNN, STuDIEs IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 742 (1994)
(discussing the types of tort claims where joint and several liability typically applies today).
46 Id. A respondeat superior case commonly involves an employer-employee relationship.
See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 208 (discussing the theoretical principles
behind the respondeat superior doctrine). To use our hypothetical, if a Beaker Chemicals
employee was drinking on his shift while transporting the company's waste to the Glorious
Waste Site, and his truck hit Nicholas Lawrence, Lawrence could hold the company liable.
The theory of respondeat superior would allow Lawrence to sue the company for its
employee's actions while on his shift. The driver would be jointly and severally liable as
well.
47 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 45, at 742. See also supra notes 34 and 39 and
accompanying text.
48
See JOHNSON & GUNN, supranote 45, at 742. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49
See infra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.
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for determining the contribution of each cause to a certain harm.50
Section 433A further states that damages for types of harm other than
distinct harms or harms which can be apportioned according to a
reasonable basis cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.51
Section 875 of the Restatement addresses indivisible harms.52 When
a harm is indivisible, each of the parties who legally caused the harm can
be held individually liable for the entire harm.0 Therefore, under the
Restatement, joint and several liability should not be applied to a
divisible harm, but it should be applied to an indivisible harm.54 The
Restatement commentary uses examples to illustrate the difference
between a harm which is divisible and a harm which is indivisible. 5 A
so

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1963-64). Therefore, using the Nicholas
Lawrence example from note 34, supra, a representative of Lacquer Paint was responsible

for striking Lawrence in the legs, a representative of Acme Plastics for holding him still,
and a representative of Beaker Chemicals for getting Lawrence to the scene; the harms are
distinct and could be reasonably separated. A court might find Lacquer Paint liable for
75% of the amount of damages, because its representative actually maimed Lawrence. The
court might further find that Acme Plastics was liable for 20% of the damages, because its
representative held Lawrence in place, but did not maim him. Finally, the court might find
Beaker Chemicals liable for only 5% of the total damages, since its representative inflicted
no physical harm upon Lawrence, but merely phoned to him to get him to come to the
scene.

51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433A (1963-64). This section of the Restatement
(Second) reads as follows:
(1)Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.
Id.
5
2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977). The Restatement (Second) of Torts states,
"Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire
harm." Id.
53 Id. To expand on the hypothetical from note 42, supra, where Nicholas Lawrence was
clubbed over the head by a representative from Lacquer Paint while simultaneously
clubbed in the ribs by a representative from Acme Plastics, we will assume that Lawrence
died instantaneously, from cardiac arrest. Once again, assume that the actions of these
representatives occurred while acting independently and not as a result of a conspiracy
between the two. Because Lawrence died as a result of the blows he sustained and they
occurred simultaneously, the harm cannot fairly be apportioned between the
representatives from Lacquer Paint and Acme Plastics. Therefore, both companies can be
held liable for the full amount of damages in the ensuing lawsuit.
54 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
5 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §433A cmt. b, d, i (1963-64) (providing illustrations
of divisible and indivisible harms). Comment b addresses distinct harms through the
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divisible harm is one which encompasses distinct acts for which
damages may be fairly estimated and apportioned.s 6 In cases involving
such distinct acts, joint and several liability does not apply because the
harm can be apportioned according to the consequences of each separate
act.57 However, the Restatement also recognizes that some divisible
harm is more difficult to apportion according to distinct acts, but that
harm is still capable of being reasonably and rationally apportioned. 58 In
cases involving such reasonable and rational apportionment of harm,
joint and several liability does not apply because some rational basis
exists for fairly apportioning the harm.5 9 In contrast to divisible harms,
indivisible harms are those harms which cannot be fairly apportioned
between tortfeasors. 6° Because no basis exists to apportion the harm,
61
each joint tortfeasor is liable for the entire harm.

example of a plaintiff who has been shot by two defendants acting independently, but at
the same time. If one defendant wounds the plaintiff's arm while the other wounds his leg,
it is possible to separate the harm that each defendant has caused since each inflicted a
separate injury. Pain and suffering expenses, along with medical expenses, may be
apportioned according to a rough estimate. The harms are distinct because each can be
attributed to a tortfeasor, so they are therefore divisible. Comment d addresses divisible
harms which are not as easily divided into distinct parts, but which can be reasonably and
rationally apportioned. An example of this sort includes when the cattle of multiple
owners trespass upon a plaintiff's land and destroy his crop. The resultant harm is the
destroyed crop, and responsibility for damages can be apportioned among the cattle
owners according to the number of cattle each owned, assuming that the harm caused is
proportional to the number of cattle which trespassed upon the land. Thus, the harm is
fairly divisible. Comment i addresses indivisible harms. Indivisible harms cannot be
separated because the injuries are neither distinct nor capable of being reasonably or
rationally apportioned. An example of an indivisible harm includes the instance where
two negligently driven vehicles collide and kill a bystander. Because both drivers acted
negligently and the result was death to the bystander, no distinct harms exist, and the harm
caused is not capable of being apportioned between the drivers. Therefore, this sort of
occurrence is one properly termed an indivisible harm, and both parties may be held liable
for the entire amount of damages.
- See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1963-64). See also supra note 55 and
accompanying text (illustrating through an example what a divisible harm is which
involves distinct acts).
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1963-64).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1963-64); see supra note 55 and accompanying
text (providing an example of a harm which is divisible because it can be reasonably and
rationally apportioned among the parties involved).
5
9See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1963-64).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433A

cmt. i (1963-64); see supra note 55 and accompanying text (addressing the example that the
Restatement provides concerning an indivisible harm); see supra note 53 and accompanying
text. See also JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 45, at 742 (explaining divisibility and
apportionment of harm among tortfeasors).
61RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977).
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As is the case in traditional common law, the Restatement also
adheres to the view that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in a tort
action. 62 After the plaintiff meets this burden of proof, the burden shifts
to the defendants to limit the scope of their liability. 63 Thus, if the action
involves two or more defendants, one or more of the defendants can
attempt to limit his or her liability by showing that the harm is divisible
and should be apportioned among the defendants.
C. Joint and Several Liability and Its Importance with Regard to the
Superfund
1. The Enactment of CERCLA: Why It Was Needed and Who Can
Be Held Liable
Responding to growing societal concern, Congress signed CERCLA
into law to establish a system to efficiently and effectively clean up
hazardous substances released into the environment. 64 By definition, a
"release" is any substance that has been spilled, leaked, pumped,
poured, emitted, emptied, discharged, injected, escaped, leached,
dumped, or disposed of into the environment. 65 Under the statute, the
term "release" therefore addresses both the intentional and unintentional
discharges of hazardous substances into the environment. 66 CERCLA
encompasses four components in dealing with these releases, including:
providing a means by which the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) can acquire and analyze information about potentially dangerous
waste sites; allowing the United States government to address and clean
up releases of hazardous substances; creating a fund known as the
Superfund to underwrite the clean up; and creating a system of
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) who are accountable for releasing
the hazardous substances into the environment in a specific locale. 67

62

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1963-64).

631d.
64 See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 302 (1997)
(explaining why the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act was enacted and the purposes enumerated in the statute). See supra notes 9-11
and accompanying text (addressing the nation's concern and worry with the hazardous
waste problem and how public sentiment spilled over into the political sector and
stimulated Congressional action).
6542 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1998).
6See

FERREY, supra note 64, at 305 (explaining the scope of the term "release" under the

CERCLA statute and stressing that for a polluter to be held liable, the releases do not have
to be intentional).
67
See U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1998). See also FERREY, supranote 64, at 302, 323-25 (stating that
the statute created certain categories of those who may be held liable (PRPs) and
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Once Congress created CERCLA, the EPA had the power to gather
information regarding hazardous waste sites and create plans for
cleaning them.6 The United States government had the authority to
mandate cleanup of the substances, and the Superfund was the trust
fund designed to pay the government's share of response, removal, and
remediation costs. 69 The Superfund originally had an allotment of $1.6
billion to pay for such costs. 70 However, the statute also specified who
could be held liable for cleanup costs and harms resulting from the
These parties were named
disposal of hazardous substances.71
addressing who falls into these categories). For further discussion of those falling into the
differing categories who are collectively termed Potentially Responsible Parties, see infra
text accompanying notes 71-73.
68See FERREY, supra note 64, at 303. Once the EPA's National Response Center is notified
concerning a release of hazardous waste, it contacts the governor of the respective state
along with the proper administrative agencies. Id. Then the EPA uses the information
which it has gathered to form running lists of problem sites nationwide. Id. The EPA then
examines the potential dangers to the public from the releases of the hazardous waste and
creates a response plan to address cleanup procedures. Id. See also TRENDS, supra note 15,
at 1 (stating that the EPA uses Superfund money to implement cleanups). Id. The EPA has
a choice of compelling PRPs to clean up the site, or it can pay contractors, states, or various
federal agencies to do so. Id. The 1997 report stated that, over approximately ten years, the
amount of Superfund money spent in paying contractors for cleanup has increased. Id. In
1996, $696 million was spent on contractor work, as compared to $261 million in 1987. Id.
69 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1998); see also FERREY, supra note 64, at 310.
70 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
71 U.S.C.A. §9607(a) (West 1998). The relevant portion of the statute states that these parties
are:

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
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Potentially Responsible Parties, or PRPs.72 There are four categories of
PRPs: present owners and operators of vessels or facilities; past owners
and operators of facilities at the time of hazardous substance disposal;
those who under contract, agreement, or other means arranged for the
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances; and those who accepted
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities.7 3
Under the statute, PRPs must eventually pay for cleanup costs unless
they can utilize one of the three affirmative defenses provided by the
statute. 74
PRPs have only a limited number of defenses to liability.75 The

76
statute provides three specific affirmative defenses to a PRP.

It

provides a defense from liability for the release of hazardous substances

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out.
Id.
72Id.

731d.
"3Id.

741Id.
75

See 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(b) (West 1998).

76 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(b) (West 1998) provides the following three specific affirmative

defenses to a PRP:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage
by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance
concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
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if the release was caused by an act of God.77 It also provides a defense if
the release was caused by an act of war.78 Finally, the statute provides a
defense if the release was caused by an act or omission of a third party
who is not related to a PRP by means of any contractual relationship, if
the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he
exercised due care with regard to the hazardous substances.79 No
additional affirmative defenses are available to a PRP.
Contrary to
some arguments advanced by defendants that proximate cause must be
shown before they are held liable, courts' interpretations of the statute
maintain that a PRP may be held liable for depositing even a minute
amount of a hazardous substance, for having a hazardous substance on
the site even once, or for having no current connection to a site.81

77 Id.

For example, if lightning struck one of Lacquer Paint's disposal containers and
released the company's ketones and organic solvents into the environment, Lacquer Paint
could use the act of God defense to avoid liability.
78 Id. Suppose the nation was at war and a bomb caused Acme Plastics' disposal containers
to explode at Glorious Waste Site, thereby releasing styrenes and benzene into the soil.
Acme Plastics would want to invoke the act of war defense to avoid being held liable for
the release of the chemicals.
79 Id.
For example, picture the CEO of Jones Foods puncturing a disposal container
originating from Beaker Chemicals while shooting rabbits at the Glorious Waste Site. If the
CEO of Jones Foods was not in a contractual relationship with Beaker Chemicals or the
Glorious Waste Site, and both Beaker Chemicals and the Glorious Waste Site could show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the container was safely sealed and stored, neither
would be held liable for the CEO's actions.
80See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1998). The statute only establishes these three affirmative
defenses. Id.
81 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989) (maintaining that
liability could be imposed on a Potentially Responsible Party for releasing even the
smallest quantity of hazardous waste). The court found that "[t]he plain statutory
language fails to impose any quantitative requirement on the term hazardous substance
and we decline to imply that any is necessary." Id. at 669. See also United States v. S.C.
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 984 (C.D.S.C. 1984) (stating that a Potentially
Responsible Party can be liable even when its waste is no longer on the site). The court
stated that "[e]ach of the generator defendants made arrangements with SCRDI or its
predecessors for disposal or treatment of wastes containing hazardous substances and ...
based on the undisputed facts, each of these generator defendants is subject to liability
under Section 107 of CERCLA." Id. at 992-93. See also Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F.
Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (addressing how courts have ruled that retroactive
applications of CERCLA with regard to joint and several liability is constitutional, based on
CERCLA's language and legislative history). The Kelly court maintained that although a
Potentially Responsible Party may not have a current relationship with a site, it can still be
liable under the statute for its past releases at the site, even if they occurred before the
statute was enacted. Id. at 1444-45.
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2. The Lack of a Specific Statutory Provision
Joint and several liability is a major concern with regard to the
Superfund, because hazardous waste disposals at any given site
commonly involve multiple polluters. Because these disposals involve
multiple polluters, the issue of liability becomes complicated when
questions arise over which party caused the harm and to what extent
each party contributed to that harm. When Congress signed CERCLA
into law in 1980, it did not set forth a specific provision relating to joint
and several liability.82 Therefore, allocation of joint and several liability
has been left to the federal courts.s0 Because no uniform standard exists
for determining allocation of joint and several liability, differing
interpretations regarding its imposition have left multiple polluters
uncertain about their responsibilities and unclear about how to proceed
in cost recovery actions under the Superfund. 84 Section III of this Note
will illustrate the differing approaches that the federal courts have taken
with regard to imposing joint and several liability under the Superfund
and analyze the rationale behind each position.85

82 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1988).

See also
Patrick S. Martin, The Legacy of Chem-Dyne: Searching for Equity in CERCLA Costrecovery

Actions, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 909 (1994) (explaining that CERCLA did not have a provision
regarding how multiple polluters should be held responsible for cleanup costs); William D.
Evans, Jr., The "Cape Fear" Features of Superfund Contribution Litigation: The Available
Remedies and Extent of Liability, 75 MICH. B. J. 1170, 1171 (1996) (stating that it is unfortunate
that Superfund does not give a specific means for allocating liability).
83
See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989),
cert.denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D.
I11.1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For an
analysis of some of these cases and an explanation of the judicial interpretations regarding
joint and several liability under them, see infra Section I. See also Martin, supra note 82 at
909 (stating that the federal courts have had to rely on their own guidance in determining
how to apportion liability upon multiple polluters at a specific site); Lynda J. Oswald, New
Directionsin Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 299, 312 (1995)
(explaining that as a result of the lack of specific language under CERCLA regarding joint
and several liability, Congress "deliberately left the task of articulating such a standard to
the courts . . . [therefore the] liability scheme today is as much the result of judicial
interpretation as it is of congressional creation").
84 See Martin, supra note 82, at 909-10.
95 See infra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.
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FEDERAL COURT POSITIONS REGARDING SUPERFUND JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY

In the absence of specific language regarding joint and several
liability in Superfund suits, the federal courts have generally followed
one of two approaches. 86 The first approach was established in United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation.87 This approach is the one which is
followed by a majority of courts and is based upon the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 88 The second approach followed by courts is one
based upon equitable factors, and it is followed by a minority of federal
courts. 89 This section will address and analyze both of the two positions
that the federal courts have taken.
A.

The Chem-Dyne (Majority)Position

Chem-Dyne was the first case to address the issue of joint and several
liability with regard to the Superfund. 90 In Chem-Dyne, the United States
Government sued twenty-four defendants alleged to have generated or
transported hazardous substances located at the Chem-Dyne treatment
facility.91 The government wanted to be reimbursed for the Superfund
money that it spent to clean the site.92 The defendants maintained that
joint and several liability could not be imposed upon them for the
government's response costs. 93 The defendants moved for a favorable
determination of partial summary judgment before the federal court. 94
In denying the defendant's motion, the federal court examined both the
86See generallyCathleen Clark, Should the Butcher, the Baker and the Candle Stick Maker be Held
Responsible for Hazardous Waste?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 871 (1994) (addressing the differing
judicial approaches and concluding that equitable apportionment is the fairest method for
imposing joint and several liability). Clark contrasts the major judicial approaches taken
with regard to joint and several liability and terms them the Restatement Method and the
Apportionment Method. Id. See also Oswald, supra note 83 (classifying the judicial
approaches as the majority approach and the minority, or moderate approach). But see
Martin, supra note 82, at 917 (arguing that there are three judicial approaches and that they
are rightly termed the Chem-Dyne Approach, the Alcan Approach, and the Moderate
Approach).
87572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
8 See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
89
See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
9 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The federal
court stated that the issue of joint and several liability was a matter of first impression to
itself as well as to other federal courts, and that there was no case authority which was
pertinent to this particular issue. Id.
91See id.
92Id.
93Id.
94Id.
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statutory language of the statute and Congress' legislative intent.95 The
court noted that when the statute was originally pending in Congress,
the language of the bill in the House of Representatives contained
explicit provisions regarding joint and several liability while any such
reference was left out of the Senate version.96 The House adopted the
Senate version, striking all references to joint and several liability from
its final version of the bill and substituting instead the silent version of
the Senate. 97 Upon examining the legislative history, the Chem-Dyne
court concluded that the two houses intended for traditional and
evolving principles of common law to be applied to each case in
determining joint and several liability. 98
Because the Chem-Dyne court believed that the legislative history
provided for courts to look to common law in considering joint and
several liability claims in Superfund suits, it turned to the Restatement

for guidance on how to address joint and several liability when multiple
polluters were involved. 99

The court stated that if the harm was

95See Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. at 805-06 (stating that the court would first examine the
pertinent statutory language, but concluding that the language was "ambiguous with
regard to the scope of liability ... [so to] discern the Congressional intent . . [the court
would] review and weigh the legislative history of the Act"). Id. at 805. The court noted
that CERCLA was established to address the very real dangers posed by the roughly thirty
to fifty thousand nationwide hazardous waste sites. Id. A major goal of the statute was to
provide governmental monetary support to immediately clean up the sites and contain the
spread of hazardous waste. Id.
96See id. at 806. The Chem-Dyne court cited to the speech of Senator Randolph regarding
the lack of a joint and several liability provision in the final version of the Senate bill. Id.
The Senator maintained that any reference to joint and several liability was stricken from
the final version of the bill because the prevailing view in the Senate was that courts should
rely upon "common law principles to determine when parties should be severally liable...
The changes were made in recognition of the difficulty in prescribing in statutory terms
liability standards which will be applicable in individual cases." Id. at 806 (citing to 126
Cong. Rec. S14969 (Nov. 24, 1980)).
9 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806. The court looked to speeches made in the House of
Representatives to discern its legislative intent with regard to its agreement to adopt the
Senate's version of the bill in not mentioning joint and several liability. Id. at 807. The
court focused on Representative Florio's speech which stated that the standard of liability
was one of strict liability, and where "issues of joint and several liability [are] not resolved
by this [they] shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law." Id.
The Representative continued to say that the omission of such language would not be fatal
because it would instead "insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and ...
encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this area." Id. (citing to
126 Cong. Rec. H11788 (Dec. 3, 1980)).
98See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; see supranotes 94-95 and accompanying text.
99See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. The Chem-Dyne court relied on the Restatement,
Second, of Torts as well as the Prosser and Keeton treatise on torts to provide insight into
the issue of joint and several liability. Id. In its opinion, the Chem-Dyne court discussed the
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divisible, and if the damages caused could be reasonably and rationally
apportioned, each defendant would be liable only for its respective
harm. 1°0 The court found that the Chem-Dyne's defendants could not
prove that the harm was divisible; thus, there was no reasonable or
rational basis for apportioning the damages. 10 1 In reaching this decision,
the court stressed that the hazardous waste at the Chem-Dyne facility had
commingled, and that the identities of the sources of the wastes were not
ascertainable. 1°2 Stating that the harm was not fairly apportionable, the
court also noted that controversy existed over which specific wastes had
polluted the groundwater, how far each waste had migrated, and how
hazardous each waste truly was. 1°3 The court therefore held that the
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment should be denied. 10 4
Other federal courts have also followed the position that the ChemDyne court established with regard to joint and several liability.10 Two

differences between divisible harms and indivisible harms. Id. For an explanation of these
differences, see supra Section II, Parts A and B and notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
100 See

Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811. The court further stated that if the harm was
indivisible, each defendant could be held liable for the entire harm. Id.
101Id.

Id. The hazardous waste at the Chem-Dyne site was truly voluminous, involving
disposals from 289 generators or transporters, and approximately 608,000 pounds of waste.
Id. Because the wastes had commingled, or mixed, harm could not fairly be apportioned.
Id.
103Id. Basing a decision regarding joint and several liability responsibility upon the volume
of waste of a certain generator or transporter would not be fair because factors such as
toxicity and migratory potential of the waste do not necessarily coincide with amount of
the waste that is disposed. Id.
104 Id. The town of Anywhere, U.S.A., from the beginning of this note can be used to
illustrate how a jurisdiction following the Chem-Dyne approach would rule in a Superfund
suit involving Lacquer Paint, Acme Plastics, and Beaker Chemicals as generator
defendants. Imagine that Lacquer Paint had deposited approximately 100 tons of waste
over thirty years, Acme Plastics deposited approximately 200 tons of waste over a period of
nineteen years, and Beaker Chemicals deposited approximately 50 tons of waste over ten
years, all of which commingled at the Glorious Waste Site. A court following the ChemDyne doctrine would not consider the amount of waste each company deposited, nor
would it consider the period of time over which the waste had been deposited. The court
would instead find that the harm caused when the waste leaked from the containers,
polluting the drinking water of Anywhere, was not fairly apportionable among the
generator defendants. It would hold each defendant liable for all of the damages, claiming
that the harm could not be fairly apportioned. Such a result is damaging to the company
which deposited the least amount, or the least toxic amount, but the Chem-Dyne approach
specifically refuses to allow these distinctions.
10 The Chem-Dyne position is the position which the majority of courts follow. See, e.g.,
United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057
(1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New
102
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of the most significant cases that adhered to the Chem-Dyne doctrine
1°7
°6
were United States v. Monsanto Company' and O'Neil v. Picillo.
Appealing from an order of summary judgment issued by the district
court, among other issues, the defendants in Monsanto contended that
they should neither be held liable to the United States nor to the South
Carolina government for response costs incurred when these two
governments removed hazardous wastes, using Superfund money, from
a disposal facility in South Carolina. 10 8 The court disagreed. 1°9 In ruling
that the defendants were within the scope of joint and several liability as
articulated by the Chem-Dyne court, the Monsanto court stressed that
apportionment of damages for harm caused could not fairly be divided
according to the volume each specific defendant deposited at the site. 110
The Monsanto court first addressed the applicable portions of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, as did the Chem-Dyne court.'
The
defendants lacked evidence that the volume of waste was directly related
to the harm caused, especially considering that the wastes had
commingled."' In dicta, the court addressed the need to show that the
district court could not apportion liability, because it lacked evidence
regarding the individual and interactive nature of the hazardous wastes
11 3
involved.
In O'Neil, the court also followed the position taken by the ChemDyne court and the Monsanto court." 4 The appellants in O'Neil generated
hazardous wastes that had been disposed of at a pig farm." 5 After a fire

York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). See also notes 86-87, supra, and
accompanying text.
106858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
107883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
108See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 164. The waste was disposed of "haphazardly." Toxin-filled
drums were randomly placed wherever available space existed in the warehouse. Id. The
drums lacked pallets underneath them to protect them from the damp ground. Id. No
documentation or inventory records were kept at the site. Id. Eventually, many drums
rusted and rotted, releasing hazardous substances. Id. These substances commingled and
led to the creation of poisonous fumes and frequent fires and explosions. Id.
109See id.
at 172.
110Id.
111Id. For a discussion of the pertinent principles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see
supra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
112 See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172.
113 See id. The court did note that in some situations, the volume of wastes each defendant

contributed may be indicative of contributory harm, but maintained that this proposition

was not workable here. Id.
114 See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
I'5 See id. at 177. Although the O'Neil court did not specifically address the types of waste
in this opinion, the lower court opinion did mention the types of waste that were disposed
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occurred, hazardous waste was released onto the land, and the
defendants maintained that they should not be held jointly and severally
liable for past or future remedial actions because their contribution was
insubstantial.11 6 The defendants argued that because the total number of
hazardous waste barrels that they were responsible for could be
demonstrated in proportion to the number of barrels excavated, they
should not have to bear the costs of all of the remedial action.11 7 In
rejecting this argument, the O'Neil court relied heavily on the findings of
the Chem-Dyne and Monsanto courts, and, in a footnote, noted that
because the wastes had commingled and could not be fairly identified
with respect to harm caused, apportionment of the damages would be
arbitrary. 1 8
Clearly, as initially evinced by the Chem-Dyne court, the federal
courts have been willing to adhere to the Restatement in ruling on joint
and several liability under the Superfund." 9 However, the Chem-Dyne
position has been criticized by courts for being too harsh, and these
courts, unwilling to follow the Chem-Dyne doctrine, maintain that
equitable factors should determine how joint and several liability should
be apportioned under the Superfund. 2 0

at the site. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988). The types of waste included
allyl alcohol, isocyanate resin, and sodium aluminum hydride. Id. at 721, 723-24.
116 See O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178. Other generators and transporters had reached prior
settlement agreements with the Environmental Protection Agency, so they were not parties
to this suit. Id.
117See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 181-82.
118 See id. at 178-79, 182-83 & n.11 (discussing that the wastes could not be fairly
apportioned; thus, it also adheres to the idea set forth in the Restatement, Second, of Torts
that tortfeasors should be held jointly and severally liable for indivisible harms).
9
"
See supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
120 See United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984)
(addressing past decisions with regard to joint and several liability under the Superfund
and contending that the Restatement approach is unnecessarily harsh). The A&F court
instead examined several factors which it maintained could more equitably apportion
liability. Id. This approach is not widely followed and is termed by many commentators as
the moderate, or minority approach. Id. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. For
other courts which have considered the A&F analysis, see generally Central Me. Power Co.
v. F.J. O'Connor Co., 838 F.Supp. 641 (D. Me. 1993); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents
Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F.Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp.
78 (D. Me. 1988).
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The A&F (Moderate)Position

In contrast to the Chem-Dyne court, the A&F court adopted a more
moderate approach to the liability question. 121 In A&F, the United States
government claimed that the defendants generated and disposed of
more than seven million gallons of hazardous waste at a waste disposal
site in Greenup, Illinois. 122 The defendants had disposed of the waste by
depositing it into lagoons and tanks on the site. 123 The government
brought suit after learning that the waste was leaking into the
environment and permeating the groundwater supply, the surrounding
soil, and the neighboring river. 124
The A&F court, like the Chem-Dyne court, examined the
legislative history surrounding CERCLA to determine how to apportion
liability for the release of hazardous substances. 125 After noting that the
language of CERCLA gave no specific guidelines concerning liability in
situations where waste from multiple polluters had commingled, the
court concluded that Congress wanted each reviewing court to address
such instances on an individual basis. 126 The A&F court relied heavily on

121 A&F, 578 F. Supp. at 1256.

The A&F court noted that a strict application of the
Restatement approach, followed by the Chem-Dyne court, was inappropriate and harsh. Id.
at 1255-56. The A&F court remarked that this approach was not equitable because it shifted
the onerous burden upon each defendant to demonstrate an individual lack of
contribution. Id.
122 Id. at 1252.
123Id.

124Id. The government wished to hold the generator defendants liable under CERCLA, and
recover Superfund monies spent on cleanup costs for the site. Id. at 1252.
125See id. at 1253. The A&F court, like the Chem-Dyne court, was concerned with how to
apportion liability among the various defendants involved. Id. However, the lack of a
uniform approach and dear standard led yet another federal court to reach its own
conclusion about how best to apportion liability. The A&F court approach is more
moderate than the Chem-Dyne approach, as will be illustrated. The A&F court realized that
commingling of wastes in the tanks and lagoons would make it difficult for the
government to show which defendant should bear responsibility for the release of the
hazardous substances. Id. Often, the wastes chemically react with each other, making
apportionment virtually impossible. Id. The court noted that following the Chem-Dyne
approach of joint and several liability shifts this burden of apportionment to each
defendant to prove an individual lack of responsibility for the release of hazardous
substances. Id. The court further stated that the imposition of joint and several liability, as
used in Chem-Dyne, would permit the government to recover all Superfund monies it
expended, even at the expense of exempting unknown and insolvent generators. Id.
126Id. at 1255. The A&F court discussed the Senate version and the House version of
CERCLA, and concluded that each house wished to provide a sense of fairness to
defendants. Id. at 1256. The court concluded that the Restatement approach, as followed
by the Chem-Dyne court, was not fair because joint and several liability could be imposed
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the proposed Gore Amendment in analyzing the proper approach to the
liability question. 127 The Gore Amendment provided for factors such as
volume and toxicity of a polluter's waste to influence a reviewing court
in apportioning liability, so it was deemed a moderate, or equitable
solution to liability apportionment.1 28 The A&F court maintained that in
passing the Gore Amendment, the House indicated a willingness to
break from a traditionally strict application of joint and several
liability. 129 After the A&F court determined that the legislature intended
for courts to use a moderate approach in imposing joint and several
liability, it praised this approach for its flexibility in promoting
individual fairness. 133 The A&F court then concluded that the moderate
approach in imposing joint and several liability was more equitable than
131
a strict approach, such as the one advanced by the Chem-Dyne court.

on a defendant polluter which only contributed a minimal amount of waste to a certain
site. Id. at 1256.
127A&F, 578 F. Supp. at 1256. In its consideration of CERCLA, the House passed the Gore
Amendment, located at 126 Cong. Rec. at H9461 (Sept. 23, 1980). Id. As discussed by the
A&F court, the Gore Amendment was friendly to multiple polluters which only
contributed minimal amounts of waste to a certain site. See A&F, 578 F. Supp. at 1256. The
Gore Amendment had several provisions to assist a court in apportioning liability, and
encouraged the reviewing court to consider the following six factors:
1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be
distinguished;
2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
4) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the
hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of
such hazardous waste; and
6) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local
officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id.
128Id. The A&F court found the Gore Amendment appealing, despite the fact that the

Senate never adopted it into its version of the bill. Id. Because the Senate did not adopt the
Gore Amendment, it did not appear in the final version of the bill, but the A&F court
looked further into the legislative intent of the Senate, as reflected in floor debates. A&F,
578 F.Supp. at 1256. The A&F court concluded that the Senate did not want to design some
mandatory standard for courts to follow regarding how to impose joint and several
liability. Id.
129Id. at 1256.
130Id. at 1257. The A&F court found that a moderate approach would serve to protect the
interests of minimal polluters, and would keep them from suffering unfair financial
punishment. See id.
'3' See id. The A&F court thus set the stage for advancing the other major approach to the
liability question. It clearly stated its finding that the moderate approach was the more
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The need for a uniform standard governing the imposition of joint
and several liability in Superfund suits is long overdue. Results in these
cases should not depend largely upon which federal court hears the case.
The next section will consider various proposals to reform the Superfund
joint and several liability scheme, but will mainly emphasize the current
political climate and how it is affecting reform proposals.
IV.

REFORMING THE SUPERFUND AND THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

The Superfund has not been neglected since Congress passed the
SARA Amendments in 1986.132 Many subsequent attempts have been
effective one, calling it "both persuasive and consistent with the intent of Congress." The
A&F, 578, F. Supp. at 1256. Using the hypothetical from note 104, supra, the difference in
philosophy between the Chem-Dyne and A&F courts can be easily understood. Assume
that Lacquer Paint had deposited 100 tons of waste at the Glorious Waste site over thirty
years, Acme Plastics had deposited 200 tons of waste over nineteen years, and Beaker
Chemicals had deposited 50 tons of waste over ten years. If the court hearing the case
followed the A&F approach, it would examine such factors as volume and toxicity of the
wastes in allocating financial responsibility among the three companies. Suppose that
although the volume of waste Lacquer Paint deposited was 100 tons, but its toxicity was
only .001% per ton while the volume of waste that Beaker Chemicals deposited was 50
tons, but its toxicity was 1% per ton. Using this approach, a court might find that since
Lacquer Paint was responsible for .1 percent of the hazardous release in terms of toxicity
per ton while Beaker Chemicals was responsible for fifty percent of the hazardous release,
Beaker Chemicals should bear a greater burden of the financial responsibility. This
example is only one possible finding that a court might make using the moderate (A&F)
approach. The court might also find that the burden should be borne fairly equally
between Lacquer Paint and Beaker Chemicals, because Lacquer Paint contributed a
significantly higher proportion of the waste. The moderate approach would allow a court
to weigh all factors such as the ones presented here on an individual basis.
3 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Buried in Measure on Toxic Waste: One Special Offer, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1997, at Al (stating that "as if banished to a legislative limbo, bills to extend the
toxic waste law have languished in three successive Congresses"). See also Alfred R. Light,
"The First Thing We Do...": The ABA's Resolution on CERCLA Reauthorization, 9 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 371 (1994) (discussing the ABA's resolution to reform the
Superfund law, which it has characterized as causing only "massive, wasteful, and
unproductive litigation" in its current state). Id. at 378; Nancy Kaplan, Esq., Superfund
Headed for Reauthorization-andRepair, in THE 1995 ExECurvE FILE: HOT ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES 19 (M. Lee Smith, ed., 1995) (supporting the contention that Superfund suits are very
involved regarding liability because "litigation is lengthy and protracted"); FRONA M.
POWELL, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 360 (1998) (stating that businesses often maintain
that Superfund lawsuits are less expensive than potential cleanup costs, and that this factor
thus fosters litigation). But see Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It's Time for Repeal After a
Decade of Failure, 12 UCLA J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 165 (1993)(discussing the problems with
Superfund and why it should be repealed instead of reformed). McGee maintains that
litigation over joint and several liability has presented one of the largest problems because
it has become so prolific. Id. at 173. See generally James A. Rogers & David H. Topol,
Proposalsfor Reforming Superfund, C883 ALI-ABA 1 (1994) (presenting the criticisms of
Superfund and outlining the various proposals designed to change it, including proposals
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made to reform the Superfund, but none have succeeded.133 Industries
and major corporations are yet again campaigning to limit their scope of
liability. 3 4 Businesses want to have restrictions placed upon the liability
scheme, so that they do not face huge financial penalties.'35 However,
environmental interest groups want to ensure that the pertinent
statutory language is broad, so that the financial burden can be placed
upon industry. 36 A major difficulty that industries face in this battle
involves the question of whether joint and several liability should be
imposed upon them, because they have the "deepest pockets" to bear the
losses. 37

by the Treasury Department, the NAACP, and the National Environmental Trust Fund).

Id.

133See supra note 132. See also Rena I. Steinzor & David Kolker, To Pay Or Not to Pay: Local
Governments' Stake in Legislation to Reauthorize Superfund, 25 URB. LAW. 627, 628 (1993)
(arguing that public opinion thought the 103rd Congress would make strides at reforming
the Superfund and stating that the last reauthorization came in 1986 with the passage of
SARA). The SARA reauthorization was a four and a half year process and "involved a
bruising battle between environmentalists, industry, and the Reagan Administration." Id.
Although the 103rd Congress did not succeed in reforming the Superfund, as history has
proved, the authors were correct in stating that the reform process was going to be "a
drawn out, acrimonious political brawl." Id.
'34 See Andrew C. Revkin, Babbitt Assails G.E. Over Delay in Ridding Hudson of Chemicals,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at Al (commenting on the lobbying efforts of corporations while
Congress again debates updating the Superfund).
1-s
Id. See also Cushman, supra note 132, at Al (stating that industries also fear having to
pay the costs of environmental restoration, in addition to penalties for cleanup of the site
itself). For example, in Montana, the Atlantic Richfield Company has spent hundreds of
millions to clean up a basin in the Clarks Fork River. Id. The company had polluted the
basin after using the site for copper mining and smelting for more than one hundred years.
Id. In addition to cleaning the site, the state wants the company to pay to restore the basin.
Id. The state sued the company for $765 million, the amount it estimates will be necessary
to pay for the environmental damage. Id.
136 See Revkin, supra note 134, at A16. But see Rogers & Topol, supra note 132, at 11
(discussing the Treasury proposal to reform the Superfund, which was made public on
September 8, 1993). Id. The Treasury proposal advocated eliminating joint and several
liability, as it was inconsistent with the philosophy that the polluter should pay the
resultant expenses of the cleanup. Id. The environmental interest groups, however, are
focused upon preserving and restoring the environment, and it can be presumed that these
groups feel that industry is best suited to bear these costs.
137See McGee, supra note 132, at 174 (stating that the EPA has increasingly "used joint and
several liability as a club, pursuing big companies with deep pockets, while often ignoring
the waste generators who are most responsible for the waste problems"). McGee illustrates
his point through the example of a case which occurred in Missouri, in which the EPA
sued only four of a possible 300 waste generators. Id. The mega-company IBM was one of
the four defendants that the EPA sued. Id. It had to engage in a lawsuit against more than
175 defendants to regain its expenses, even though it had contributed less than one percent
of the waste at the site. Id.
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Political pressures and party ideologies have significantly impeded
reform attempts. 138 Republicans generally maintain that joint and
several liability should be eliminated and replaced with a proportional
liability scheme. 139 In a proportional liability scheme, cleanup costs
would be assessed in accordance with the amount of waste that a party
deposited at a given site. 140
Conversely, Democrats generally maintain that while the Superfund
is in need of reform, its principle of forcing any responsible polluter to
pay should be retained.' 4' The controversy lies in trying to forge a
13 See generally 1996 BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 9, at 79 (discussing the differences between
the Democrat and Republican positions regarding the Superfund). See also What Do
President Bill Clinton, EPA Administrator Carol Browner and the EPA Inspector General Say
About
Superfund?
(June
27,
1996)
<
http://www.house.gov/transportation/press/press45O.htm [hereinafter What Do They
Say?] (stating that in March and April 1996, the Clinton Administration and the Democrats
presented thirty-four different proposals to the House Republicans, seven of which were
rejected completely, and twenty of which the Republicans either accepted completely or
modified).
139 See 1996 BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 9, at 79. In the Republican view, imposing strict,
joint and several liability fosters litigation instead of site cleanup. Id. Also, many
Republicans holding Congressional offices have urged an end to retroactive liability.
Advocates of this view see retroactive liability as an unfair punishment because it penalizes
parties for waste disposals which were legal and done in accordance with law when they
were made. Id.
140See id. See also Chairman Shuster Pleased With Initial Subcommittee Hearing on Superfund
(June 13, 1995)
<http://www.house.gov/transportation/press/1995/press589.htm
(discussing how to reform Superfund). Although the bill did not succeed, his statement
about the bill provides an insightful view of the Republican position. He stated that the
liability reforms would:
[I]nsert more fairness into the process, reduce transaction costs, and
help small businesses who have been caught up in Superfund ...
Small parties, who sent 1% or less of the waste to the site, are
completely out of the system. These people do not have to hire
lawyers and get dragged through years of litigation. For everyone
else, today's litigation is replaced by an equitable allocation system.
Id.
141 See Cushman, supra note 132, at A17 (stating that many Democrats are wary of any
proposal that would detract from the "original intent and goal of the Superfund
legislation"). See also What Do They Say?, supra note 138 (saying that the Clinton
Administration and the Democratic Party has altered their position regarding joint and
several liability from one of "you can't pay for it" to "the polluter should pay, not the
taxpayer; Superfund liability is fair; people should pay for any harm that they caused").
But see 1996 BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 9, at 79. Here, the EPA Administrator, Carol
Browner, conceded that the Superfund liability provisions were broad and far-reaching. Id.
The Administrator, contrary to the Republican position, felt that the retroactive liability
scheme should be retained, forcing companies to assume responsibility for their past
actions. Id. However, the EPA Administrator favored a statutory exemption for some
smaller entities, including municipal landfills, homeowners, and smaller companies. Id.
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compromise between the Republicans and the Democrats. Except for the
142
past three terms, Congress has been unable to reach such compromise.
In the 104th Congress, two major reform bills were proposed. 143 Senator
Smith, who introduced a bill in the 104th Congress without success, also
introduced a bill in the 105th Congress.144
While the political controversy rages over what liability provisions
should be included in the Superfund, towns such as Anywhere, U.S.A.,
face immediate, dangerous consequences when hazardous substances
are released into the environment. 145 A very real example of a site
currently in desperate need of cleanup is the Hudson River. 146 However,
142See Cushman, supra note 132. See also note 132 and accompanying text.

The bill that presumably received the most attention was proposed by Congressman
Michael Oxley, a Republican from Ohio. His bill was designated H.R. 2500, 104th Cong.
(1995), and its provisions are discussed in some detail in the 1996 BRIEFING BOOK, supra
note 9, at 79. A convenient summary of this bill's major provisions can also be found
online, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR2500:@@@D.
Consistent
with the Republican position, this bill sought to lessen liability for certain municipal
landfills and small businesses. Id. H.R. 2500 also sought to limit the retroactive nature of
Superfund liability by giving reimbursements from Superfund money to PRPs for fifty
percent of their cleanup costs occurring after H.R. 2500 was introduced, but this exemption
was only to apply if a PRP was liable before 1987. Id. Senator Bob Smith, a Republican
from New Hampshire, introduced the other major bill, designated S. 1285, 104th Cong.
(1995), but his bill was quickly stalled. See 1996 BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 9, at 79. This bill
faced opposition from the Majority Leader, also a Republican, concerning tax credit
provisions. Id.
144S. 8, 105th Cong. (1997). As of yet, this bill has not been passed. Representative Bud
Shuster, a Republican from Pennsylvania, also lent his support to the bill. See generally
Chairman ShusterApplauds Introduction of the Smith-Chafee-Lott Superfund Reform Bill Uan. 22,
1997) <http://www.house.gov/transportation/press/presss09.htm (stating his belief that
the 105th Congress would be successful in finally reforming the Superfund).
14 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In the hypothetical posed at the beginning of
this note, government officials had just discovered that the groundwater supply reaching
the town of Anywhere was polluted. To extend the hypothetical, it is now necessary to
consider the ramifications of such pollution. The residents of Anywhere cannot drink
water from their faucets for fear of ingesting possible toxic agents. Vegetation in gardens
will be adversely affected if it is supplied with this water. Residents cannot eat fruits and
vegetables raised with this water without possibly being exposed to toxins. The water also
exposes various land and water animals to the toxins.
146See Revkin, supra note 134 at Al, A16. Two General Electric factories located along the
upper banks are responsible for the release of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into the
Hudson. Id at A16. The PCBs have spread across approximately two hundred miles of the
Hudson. Id. The chemicals have already adversely affected fish and wildlife, and scientists
have recently discovered that the toxins are present in alarming levels in bald eagles and
other birds. Id. PCBs are also thought to be linked to cancer and various learning
disabilities as well, therefore presenting a very real threat to humans. Id. The release of
hazardous substances into a water body is not uncommon. See also Cushman, supra note
132, at A17. In California, controversy looms over the release of chemicals such as DDT
into the seacoast near Palos Verdes. Id.
143
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the company responsible for paying the costs is currently struggling to
influence the legislature to limit its liability. 147 Industries and interest
148
groups are not the only ones lobbying for their interests.
Congressmembers are also trying to curry favor with one another by
creating proposals favorable to key committee members. 149
The
legislature must reach a compromise with regard to Superfund liability
provisions if it wishes to expedite cleanup of polluted sites.15" As the
political sparring continues, towns such as Anywhere, U.S.A., suffer the
consequences from the release of hazardous waste. The next section of
this Note proposes a solution to how joint and several liability should be
apportioned in Superfund suits.
V.

A

UNIFORM APPROACH TO JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABinTY IN

SUPERFUND SUrMs

Achieving a uniform approach to joint and several liability in
Superfund suits will require compromise between opposing political
interests and ideologies, as well as between environmental interest
groups and industry. The Superfund should continue to pay for the
cleanup of hazardous wastes, but reimbursement to the Superfund
should be justly apportioned. Such just apportionment would involve
combining principles from both ends of the political spectrum to create a
solution that would be as equitable as possible for all affected parties.

14 See Revkin, supra note 134, at Al, A16.

The responsible company, General Electric,
discovered that it was responsible for the release of the toxins in the 1980s. Id. at A16. The
company stated that it has located and stopped "almost all new releases of the chemicals..
Id. Arguing that liability laws should be limited in their scope, the company pointed out
that it has already spent in excess of $130 million to prevent further contamination from
occurring in the waters of the Hudson. Id. at Al.
14 See supra notes 133,135-36 and accompanying text.
49 See Cushman, supra note 132, at Al. To gain support for their proposal, Republicans
induded a special provision for the home state of the ranking Democrat on the Senate
Environment Committee because this committee is now considering the bill. Id. The state
is Montana, which is currently suing the Atlantic Richfield Company for over half a million
dollars to pay for environmental restoration at along the upper basin of the Clarks Fork
River. Id. See also supra note 134 and accompanying text. In the current bill, Republicans
are hoping to limit claims to pay for environmental restoration. See Cushman, supra note
132, at Al. Limiting such claims would force taxpayers in states without such special
provisions to bear the costs of environmental restoration. Id. at A17. Such political
bargaining is quite usual among parties, and this instance is "typical of the kind of horsetrading that is commonplace on Capitol Hill, especially in complicated cases like
Superfund that involve many opposing interests." Id. at Al.
150See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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A. The Proposal
This proposal will include enforcement provisions as well as
prospective measures to encourage future compliance in meeting
disposal guidelines mandated by the EPA or the applicable state law.151
The proposal reads as follows:
1) Liability shall be apportioned among multiple
polluters at a given site in accordance with the volume and
toxicity of the wastefor which each polluter is responsible.
2) Retroactive liability shall be retained.
3) Manufacturersof hazardoussubstances shall pay a
user fee when producing such substances. The user fee shall
be proportionalto the volume and toxicity of the materials in
question.
4) Proceedsfrom the user fees shall go directly into
the Superfund.
5) When effecting a disposal, a company shall obtain
government certification that the substances have been
disposed of in accordance with guidelines mandated by the
EPA or the applicable state law.
6) Upon receiving proper government certification
that the disposal has been made in accordance with guidelines
mandated by the EPA or the applicable state law, the end user
of a hazardous substance shall be entitled to partial
reimbursement of the userfee.
Thus, this proposal suggests a just apportionment of joint and
several liability in Superfund suits and is more in accordance with the
philosophy of the A&F court 52 than that of the Chem-Dyne court.153
Further, and perhaps more importantly, the proposal blends elements

15 This proposal is designed to specifically address joint and several liability in Superfund
suits. Congress did not create a specific provision concerning joint and several liability in.
Superfund suits when it enacted CERCLA. See supra note 19, notes 82-85 and
accompanying text. The absence of a joint and several liability provision in CERCLA has
generally led federal courts to follow one of two approaches when determining joint and
several liability in Superfund suits. See supra notes 86-131 and accompanying text. The
lack of a uniform approach with regard to how federal courts should impose joint and
several liability in Superfund suits has led to inconsistent results. Id. Thus, this proposal
serves as an addition to the existing CERCLA statute because it is designed to specifically
address the issue of joint and several liability in Superfund suits.
152United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Il1.1984).
53 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For a comparison
of the Chem-Dyne and A&F approaches, see supra notes 86-131 and accompanying text.
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from a wide band of the ideological spectrum.15 4 The institution of a
proportional liability scheme reflects Republican philosophy while the
retention of retroactive liability reflects traditional Democratic
thought.I s5
Yet, both principles are capable of working together
harmoniously and effectively to realize a uniform approach in imposing
joint and several liability in Superfund suits.
B.

The Principles Behind the Proposal
1.

A Proportional Liability Scheme

The use of proportional liability in Superfund suits would allow
courts to have a concrete basis for apportioning liability. Even if wastes
have commingled at a disposal site, courts can examine the volume and
toxicity of the amount of waste that each polluter has contributed and,
based upon these considerations, can apportion liability for cleanup costs
among the various parties.
Republicans have often advocated a
proportional liability scheme, but use of such a scheme, if based on the
volume and toxicity of a polluter's waste, is consistent with the "polluter
pays" doctrine advanced by Democrats.15 6 Under a proportional liability
scheme, each polluter would be responsible for the costs of the cleanup,
but this liability would be assessed according to each polluter's share of
disposed waste at the site. Many Democrats also maintain that in
considering Superfund reform proposals, the legislature must be careful
to adhere to the statute's original intent and goals17 A proportional
liability scheme based on volume and toxicity of the disposed waste does
not appear to conflict with the statute's original intent.'5 6 Furthermore,
the adoption of a proportional liability scheme in which courts allocate
liability based on the volume and toxicity of disposed waste would also
provide defendants in Superfund suits with a degree of certainty and
predictability. 159 The next principle set forth in this Note favors retaining
retroactivity in Superfund suits. This principle is arguably more

154 For

a discussion of the differing political ideologies regarding liability in Superfund
suits, see supra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.
15See supra notes 139 and 141 and accompanying text.
156
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157ld.
5
1 8 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
159Using this type of proportional liability scheme would presumably avoid the "frantic
and expensive search for other parties to whom to disperse costs... [along with the] costly
and protracted litigations that have left the cleanup process hamstrung." KRAMER &
BRIFFAULT, supra note 33, at 64.
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controversial than the proportional liability scheme, but the retroactivity
principle is clearly within the spirit of the original CERCLA legislation. 16°
2.

Retaining Retroactivity

In a Superfund suit, PRPs are often held responsible for actions
which have occurred many years ago. This principle, known as
retroactivity, has been widely criticized as unfair and inconsistent with
the principles of tort law. 161 However, the Superfund must continue to
apply retroactive liability to PRPs if it is to be effective in achieving
cleanup.1 62 Retroactive liability in Superfund suits directly assists the
environment because it forces PRPs to account for their past actions,
even if a PRP acted in accordance with the law at the time of the
disposal. Republicans have argued that retroactive liability should be
eliminated while Democrats have argued that it should be retained. 163
Although the imposition of retroactive liability may seem unfair to
PRPs who abided by existing laws at the time they made a disposal,
retaining such liability seems to be environmentally practical. 16
Retaining retroactive liability in Superfund suits would ensure to the
fullest extent practicable that a PRP would reimburse the Superfund for
past actions which have caused environmental problems.
The
Superfund would thereby be replenished by PRPs instead of burdening

160See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. See supra note 139 for a discussion of
Republican philosophy regarding retroactivity in Superfund suits. See supra note 141 for an
analysis of Democratic thought concerning retroactivity in Superfund suits.
161 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. See also KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 33,
at 57 (stating that the presence of strict and retroactive liability in the Superfund makes
PRI's liable for even the most "indirect and improbable consequences of actions taken
decades ago with respect to waste disposal," even if the PRP followed the existing law with
regard to disposal).
162 If retroactive liability could not be imposed in Superfund suits, what would happen to
towns such as Anywhere, U.S.A.? Provided the Superfund has enough money, a
contractor could be hired to clean up the release of hazardous substances, but how would
the Superfund be reimbursed? PRPs must reimburse the Superfund, for if it ceases to exist,
the taxpayers would become directly responsible for bearing all of the cleanup costs. Such
a result would defeat a proportional liability scheme, as the Republicans advocate, as well
as
the "polluter pays" doctrine, as the Democrats advocate.
16
See supra notes 139 and 141 and accompanying text.
164See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Putting political ideologies aside, imposing
retroactive liability will force PRIs to be active in taking responsibility for cleanups.
Complex suits such as the Superfund involve varied "political, sociological, economic, and
technological implications... [however] we must consider not only the individual litigant
and lawyer, but entire communities." JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS

TORT LITIGATION:

THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS,

MULTIPARTY DEVICES

46 (1995).
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taxpayers with additional expenses. It may be necessary, however, to
make retention of retroactivity more politically palatable by inserting an
ameliorative clause designed to provide relief to companies, particularly
small businesses, that are facing financial ruin and dissolution because
previously accepted disposal practices that they followed in good faith
are now environmental threats. Finally, the consideration of retroactive
liability can exert a salutary effect upon some hazardous substance
disposers by forcing them to exercise greater care in disposal techniques
than, absent the specter of possible future liability, would otherwise be
their inclination. The next principle that this proposal establishes is the
creation of the user fee. The user fee is necessary to increase immediate
Superfund monies, as well as to encourage compliance with proper
disposal methods. 165
3. The User Fee
This proposal suggests placing a user fee upon manufacturers of
hazardous substances. This user fee should be proportionate to the
volume and toxicity of the particular substance and would, naturally, be
passed on in the price of the product to each successive user. End users
would be able to receive partial reimbursement of this user fee if they
produced government documentation showing that the substance had
been disposed of in accordance with procedures mandated by the EPA
or the applicable state law. 166 Placing a user fee on hazardous substances
has a twofold purpose. First, proceeds from the user fee can go directly
into the Superfund, thereby increasing the amount of money
immediately available for cleanups.
Second, providing partial
reimbursement of the fee for suitable disposal will ultimately encourage
compliance with proper disposal methods. 167 Although such compliance

See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
protect against fraud, EPA officials or state environmental authorities would have to
verify that the hazardous substances were disposed of properly. This verification could
take place through an EPA or state environmental on-site examination, for instance. An
on-site examination is only one possibility to ensure verification, and this note does not
suggest that an on-site examination should be the only means of meeting the verification
requirement.
167For instance, if Beaker Chemicals manufactured one ton of benzene, and paid a user fee
of 50c per pound, the assessed user fee would be $1000. The user fee that Beaker
Chemicals paid would be reflected in the cost the company would charge for benzene.
Under the proposal in this note, that money would go into the Superfund to pay for
various cleanups. If Acme Plastics purchased the benzene to use in making plastics, and
properly disposed of its waste, it would receive documentation allowing for partial
reimbursement of the user fee. Even if the legislature decided to allow a company to be
reimbursed for only 25% of the fee, Acme Plastics could still receive $250. This
16

166To
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would not allow a PRP to escape liability under the proposal in this
Note, it will encourage PRPs to make disposals as environmentally safe
as possible.'6
Imposing user fees and providing for their partial
reimbursement will offer financial incentives for complete and careful
tracking of hazardous substances, from the time of manufacture to the
time of disposal.
Furthermore, such user fees would not be fundamentally unfair to
the purchasers of hazardous substances. The fee would not unduly
burden the manufacturers because they could pass on the additional
costs in the price of their products in a fashion similar to a value added
tax. The scheme will, of course, cost the final consumer a bit more, but,
by offering some financial incentive for proper disposal, it will
encourage voluntary compliance with disposal regulations.
The
consequent provision of additional environmental protection should
generate widespread public acceptance of the levy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since its creation in 1980, the Superfund has caused a great deal of
angst, uncertainty, and resistance, particularly with regard to liability.
In creating the Superfund, Congress failed to define how joint and
several liability should be imposed upon PRPs. This lack of legislative
guidance has led courts to apply different approaches to the imposition
of joint and several liability in Superfund suits. This lack of uniformity
has perpetuated remedial inconsistency, which can be best remedied by
a uniform approach to joint and several liability. Delay and excessive
litigative expense cannot continue to consume PRPs, as they desperately
try to avoid being drawn into the Kafkaesque landscape of uncertainty
perpetuated by inequitable apportionment of liability. A just and
uniform approach to joint and several liability will dispel uncertainty by
providing PRPs with firmer guidelines as to how liability will be
apportioned.
For a uniform approach to be adopted, however,
politicians of all stripes must be willing to engage in ideological
compromise. Competing political philosophies can no longer continue
to postpone solutions at the expense of the environment.
This Note has provided one proposal for establishing a uniform
approach to joint and several liability in Superfund suits. As our country
approaches the third millennium, it is imperative that its leaders
reimbursement would, in this author's view, provide great incentive for a company to
dispose of its waste properly.
t68See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
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seriously address the grave consequences engendered by decades of
releasing hazardous substances into the environment. PRPs must be
held accountable for the costs of cleaning up the environment when their
actions result in the release of hazardous substances. However, the PRP
with the "deepest pockets" should not be the one that is held
accountable for the bulk of the cost.
Liability should be justly
apportioned, in accordance with the volume and toxicity of the
hazardous substances for which the PRP is responsible. Steps should be
taken to encourage proper disposal of hazardous substances. Imposing
user fees upon hazardous substances and allowing for their partial
reimbursement after proper disposal could provide a great incentive to
carefully comply with mandated disposal standards. Such incentives
cannot displace the need to retain retroactivity in Superfund suits,
however. Each polluter should pay for tainting the environment, but a
polluter's liability should be apportioned in the most equitable fashion
possible. To protect the future of towns such as Anywhere, U.S.A.,
elected representatives must provide the guidance that has been
conspicuously lacking in the past. Through legislative remediation, this
country must provide the framework and the leadership that will allow
its courts to apply a uniform approach to joint and several liability in
Superfund suits.

-Jennifer L. Stringer
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